

Do Analyst Conflicts Matter? Evidence from Stock Recommendations

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Abstract

We examine whether conflicts of interest with investment banking and brokerage businesses induce sell-side analysts to issue optimistic stock recommendations and, if so, whether investors are misled by such biases. Using quantitative measures of potential conflicts constructed from a novel data set containing revenue breakdowns of analyst employers, we find that recommendation levels are indeed positively related to conflict magnitudes. The optimistic bias stemming from investment banking conflicts was especially pronounced during the late-1990s stock market bubble. However, evidence from the response of stock prices and trading volumes to upgrades and downgrades suggests that the market recognizes analysts' conflicts and properly discounts analysts' opinions. This pattern persists even during the bubble period. Moreover, the 1-year stock performance following revised recommendations is unrelated to the magnitude of conflicts. Overall, our findings do not support the view that conflicted analysts are able to systematically mislead investors with optimistic stock recommendations.

1. Introduction

In April 2003, 10 of the largest Wall Street firms reached a landmark settlement with state and federal securities regulators on the issue of conflicts of interest

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faced by stock analysts.¹ The settlement requires the firms to pay a record \$1.4 billion in compensation and penalties in response to government charges that the firms issued optimistic stock research to win favor with potential investment banking (IB) clients. Part of the settlement funds are earmarked for investor education and for provision of research from independent firms. In addition to requiring large monetary payments, the settlement mandates structural changes in the firms' research operations and requires the firms to disclose conflicts of interest in analysts' research reports.

The notion that investors are victims of biased stock research presumes that (1) analysts respond to the conflicts by inflating their stock recommendations and (2) investors take analysts' recommendations at face value. Even if analysts are biased, it is possible that investors understand the conflicts of interest inherent in stock research and rationally discount analysts' opinions. This alternative viewpoint, if accurate, would lead to very different conclusions about the consequences of analysts' research. Indeed, investors' rationality and self-interested behavior imply that stock prices should accurately reflect a consensus about the informational quality of public announcements (Grossman 1976; Grossman and Stiglitz 1980). Rational investors would recognize and adjust for analysts' potential conflicts of interest and thereby largely avoid the adverse consequences of biased stock recommendations.

In this article, we provide evidence on the extent to which analysts and investors respond to conflicts of interest in stock research. We address four questions. First, is the extent of optimism in stock recommendations related to the magnitudes of analysts' conflicts of interest? Second, to what extent do investors discount the opinions of more conflicted analysts? In particular, do stock prices and trading volumes react to recommendation revisions in a manner that rationally reflects the degree of analysts' conflicts? Third, is the medium-term (that is, 3- to 12-month) performance of recommendation revisions related to conflict severity? And, finally, did conflicts of interest affect analysts or investors differently during the late-1990s stock bubble than during the postbubble period? The answers to these questions are clearly of relevance to stock market participants, public policy makers, regulators, and the academic profession.

We use a unique, hand-collected data set that contains the annual revenue breakdown for 232 public and private analyst employers. This information allows us to construct quantitative measures of the magnitude of potential conflicts not only from IB business but also from brokerage business. We analyze a sample of over 110,000 stock recommendations issued by over 4,000 analysts during the 1994–2003 time period. Using univariate tests as well as cross-sectional regressions that control for the size of the company followed and individual analysts' experience, resources, workloads, and reputations, we attempt to shed

¹ Two more securities firms (Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. and Thomas Weisel Partners LLC) were added to the formal settlement in August 2004.

light both on how analysts respond to pressures from IB and brokerage businesses and on how investors compensate for the existence of such conflicts of interest.

A number of studies (for example, Dugar and Nathan 1995; Lin and McNichols 1998; Michaely and Womack 1999; Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan 2000; Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter 2008) focus on conflicts faced by analysts in the context of existing underwriting relationships (see also Malmendier and Shanthikumar 2007; Cliff 2007).² Our article complements this literature in several ways. First, we take into account the pressure to generate underwriting business from both current and potential client companies. Even if an analyst's firm does not currently do IB business with a company that the analyst tracks, it might like to do so in the future. Second, we examine the conflict between research and all IB services (including advice on mergers, restructuring, and corporate control), rather than just underwriting. Third, we examine conflicts arising from brokerage business in addition to those from IB.³

Fourth, the prior empirical finding that underwriter analysts tend to be more optimistic than other analysts is consistent with two alternative interpretations: (a) an optimistic report on a company by an underwriter analyst is a reward for past IB business or an attempt to win future IB business by currying favor with the company or (b) a company chooses an underwriter whose analyst already likes the stock. The second interpretation implies that underwriter choice is endogenous and does not necessarily imply a conflict of interest. We sidestep this issue of endogeneity by not focusing on underwriting relations between an analyst's firm and the company followed. Instead, our conflict measures focus on the importance to the analyst's firm of IB and brokerage businesses, as measured by the percentage of its annual revenue derived from IB business and from brokerage commissions. Unlike underwriting relations between an analyst's firm and the company followed, the proportions of the entire firm's revenues from each of these businesses can reasonably be viewed as given, exogenous variables from the viewpoint of an individual analyst. Finally, our approach yields substantially larger sample sizes than those used in prior research, and it therefore leads to greater statistical reliability of the results.

Several articles adopt an approach that is similar in spirit to ours. For example, Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007) find that recommendation upgrades (downgrades) by investment banks—which typically also have brokerage businesses—

² Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2007) theoretically analyze a different type of conflict of interest in financial intermediation, one faced by a financial advisor whose firm also produces financial products (such as in-house mutual funds). Mehran and Stulz (2007) provide an excellent review of the literature on conflicts of interest in financial institutions.

³ Hayes (1998) analyzes how pressure on analysts to generate brokerage commissions affects the availability and accuracy of earnings forecasts. Both Irvine (2004) and Jackson (2005) find that analysts' optimism increases a brokerage firm's share of the trading volume. Ljungqvist et al. (2007) find that analysts employed by larger brokerage houses issue more optimistic recommendations and more accurate earnings forecasts. However, none of these articles examines how investors' responses to analysts' recommendations and the investment performance of recommendations vary with the severity of brokerage conflicts, issues that we investigate here.

underperform (outperform) similar recommendations by non-IB brokerages and independent research firms. Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006) find that full-service securities firms—which have both IB and brokerage businesses—issue less optimistic forecasts and recommendations than do non-IB brokerage houses. Finally, Jacob, Rock, and Weber (2008) find that short-term earnings forecasts made by investment banks are more accurate and less optimistic than those made by independent research firms. We extend this line of research by quantifying the reliance of a securities firm on IB and brokerage businesses. This is an important feature of our article for at least two reasons. First, given that many securities firms operate in multiple lines of business, it is difficult to classify them by business lines. By separately measuring the magnitudes of both IB and brokerage conflicts in each firm, our approach avoids the need to rely on a classification scheme. Second, since the focus of this research is on the consequences of analysts' conflicts, the measurement of those conflicts is important. Our conclusions sometimes differ from those in classification-based studies.

We find that analysts do indeed seem to respond to pressures from IB and brokerage businesses: larger potential conflicts of interest from these businesses are associated with more positive stock recommendations. We also document that the distortive effects of IB conflicts were larger during the late-1990s stock bubble than during the postbubble period. Nonetheless, the empirical analysis yields several pieces of evidence to suggest that investors are sophisticated enough to adjust for these biases. First, the short-term reactions of both stock prices and trading volumes to recommendation upgrades are negatively and statistically significantly related to the magnitudes of potential IB or brokerage conflicts. For downgrades, the corresponding relation is negative for stock prices but positive for trading volumes. Second, the 1-year investment performance after recommendation revisions bears no systematic relation to the magnitude of conflicts. Finally, investors continued to discount conflicted analysts' opinions during the bubble period, even amid the euphoria prevailing in the market at the time. Together these results strongly support the idea that the marginal investor, taking analysts' conflicts into account, rationally discounts optimistic stock recommendations.⁴

The remainder of the article is organized as follows. We discuss the issues in Section 2 and describe our sample and data in Section 3. Section 4 examines the relation between recommendation levels and the degree of IB or brokerage conflict faced by analysts. Section 5 analyzes how conflicts are related to the response of stock prices or trading volumes to recommendation revisions. Section

⁴ In a companion paper (Agrawal and Chen 2005), we find that analysts appear to respond to conflicts when making long-term earnings growth projections but not short-term earnings forecasts. This finding is consistent with the idea that, with short-term forecasts, analysts worry about their deception being revealed with the next quarterly earnings release, but they have greater leeway with long-term forecasts. We also find that the frequency of forecast revisions is positively related to the magnitude of brokerage conflicts, and several tests suggest that analysts' trade generation incentives impair the quality of stock research.

6 investigates the relation between conflicts and the investment performance of recommendation revisions. Section 7 presents our results for the late-1990s stock bubble and postbubble periods, and Section 8 concludes.

2. Issues and Hypotheses

Investment banking activity is a potential source of analyst conflict that has received widespread attention in the financial media (for example, Gasparino 2002; Maremont and Bray 2004) as well as the academic literature (for example, Lin and McNichols 1998; Michaely and Womack 1999). When IB business is an important source of revenue for a securities firm, a stock analyst employed by the firm often faces pressure to inflate his or her recommendations. This pressure is due to the fact that the firm would like to sell IB services to a company that the analyst tracks.⁵ The company, in turn, would like the analyst to support its stock with a favorable opinion. Thus, we expect that the more critical is IB revenue to an analyst's employer, the greater the incentives an analyst faces to issue optimistic recommendations.⁶

Analysts also face a potential conflict with their employers' brokerage businesses. Here, the pressure on analysts originates not from the companies that they follow but from within their employing firms. Brokerage business generates a large portion of most securities firms' revenues, and analyst compensation schemes are typically related explicitly or implicitly to trading commissions. Thus, analysts have incentives to increase trading volumes in both directions (that is, buys and sells). Given the many institutional constraints that make short sales relatively costly, many more investors participate in stock purchases than in stock sales.⁷ Indeed, it is mostly existing shareholders of a stock who sell. This asymmetry between purchases and sales implies that the more important brokerage business is to an analyst's employer, the more pressure the analyst faces to be bullish when issuing recommendations.

Analysts who respond to the conflicts they face by issuing blatantly misleading stock recommendations can develop bad reputations that reduce their labor income and hurt their careers.⁸ Stock recommendations, however, are not as easily evaluated as other outputs of analysts' research, such as 12-month price targets or quarterly earnings forecasts, which can be judged against public, near-

⁵ Throughout this article, we refer to an analyst's employer as a "firm" and a company followed by an analyst as a "company."

⁶ Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006, forthcoming) find that, while optimistic recommendations do not help the analyst's firm win the lead underwriter or comanager positions in general, they help the firm win the comanager position in deals in which the lead underwriter is a commercial bank.

⁷ Numerous regulations in the United States increase the cost of selling shares short (see, for example, Dechow et al. 2001). Therefore, the vast majority of stock sales are regular sales rather than short sales. For example, over the 1994–2001 period, short sales comprised only about 10 percent of the annual New York Stock Exchange trading volume (New York Stock Exchange 2002).

⁸ See Jackson (2005) for a theoretical model showing that analysts' concerns about their reputations can reduce optimistic biases arising from brokerage business.

term realizations. So it is not clear whether analysts' career concerns can completely prevent them from responding to pressures to generate IB or brokerage business.

The relation between conflict severity and the short-term (2- or 3-day) stock price impact of a recommendation should depend on whether investors react to the opinion rationally or naively.⁹ Under the rational discounting hypothesis, the relation should be asymmetric for upgrades and downgrades. For upgrades, the stock price response should be negatively related to the degree of conflict. This implication arises because analysts who face greater pressure from IB or brokerage business are likely to be more bullish in their recommendations, and rational investors should discount an analyst's optimism more heavily. For downgrades, however, the story is different. When an analyst downgrades a stock despite facing large conflicts, rational investors should find the negative opinion more convincing and should be more likely to revalue the stock accordingly. This implies that the short-term stock price response to a downgrade should be negatively related to the degree of conflict.

The rational discounting hypothesis also predicts cross-sectional relations between conflict severity and the short-term trading volume responses to recommendations. As Kim and Verrecchia (1991) demonstrate in a rational expectations model of trading, the more precise a piece of news, the more individuals will revise their prior beliefs and, hence, the more trading that will result. In the present context, investor rationality implies that an upgrade by a highly conflicted analyst represents less precise news to investors, and so such a revision should be followed by a relatively small abnormal volume. But when an analyst downgrades a stock despite a substantial conflict, the signal is regarded as being more precise, and thus the downgrade should lead to relatively large abnormal trading.

By contrast, under the naive investor hypothesis, investors are largely ignorant of the distortive pressures that analysts face and accept analysts' recommendations at face value. This implies that there should be no relation between conflict severity and the short-term response of either stock prices or trading volume to recommendation revisions. Furthermore, the absence of a systematic relation should hold true for both upgrades and downgrades.

What are the implications of the two hypotheses for the medium-term (3- to 12-month) investment performance of analysts' recommendations? Under the rational discounting hypothesis, there should be no systematic relation between the magnitude of conflicts faced by an analyst and the performance of his or her stock recommendations: the market correctly anticipates the potential distortions up front and accordingly adjusts its response. But the naive investor hypothesis predicts that performance should be negatively related to conflict

⁹ This framework follows Kroszner and Rajan (1994) and Gompers and Lerner (1999), who analyze the conflicts that a bank faces in underwriting securities of a company when the bank owns a (debt or equity) stake in it.

severity for both upgrades and downgrades. That is, investors ignore analysts' conflicts up front and pay for their ignorance later.

3. Sample and Data

3.1. Sample

Our sample of stock recommendations comes from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) U.S. Detail Recommendations History file. This file contains data on newly issued recommendations as well as revisions and reiterations of existing recommendations made by individual analysts over the period 1993–2003. Although the exact wording of recommendations can vary considerably across brokerage houses, I/B/E/S classifies all recommendations into five categories ranging from strong buy to strong sell. We rely on the I/B/E/S classification and encode recommendations on a numerical scale from 5 (strong buy) to 1 (strong sell).

Since we are primarily interested in examining how the nature and consequences of analysts' recommendations are related to IB or brokerage business, we require measures of the importance of these business lines to analysts' employers. Under U.S. law, all registered broker-dealer firms must file audited annual financial statements with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in x-17a-5 filings.¹⁰ These filings contain information on broker-dealer firms' principal sources of revenue, broken down into revenue from IB, brokerage commissions, and all other businesses (such as asset management and proprietary trading). We use these filings to obtain various financial data, including data on our key explanatory variables: the fractions of total brokerage house revenues from IB and from brokerage commissions. Beginning with the names of analyst employers contained in the I/B/E/S Broker Translation file,¹¹ we search for all available revenue information in x-17a-5 filings from 1994 to 2003.¹² For publicly traded broker-dealer firms, we also use 10-K annual report filings over the sample period to gather information on revenue breakdowns, if necessary. We thus obtain annual data from 1994 to 2003 on IB revenue, brokerage revenue, and other revenue for 188 privately held and 44 publicly traded brokerage houses.¹³ For each brokerage house, we match recommendations to the latest broker-year revenue data preceding the recommendation date. Over the sample period, we

¹⁰ The Securities Exchange Act, sections 17(a)–17(e), requires these filings. We accessed them from Thomson Financial's Global Access database and the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) public reading room in Washington, D.C.

¹¹ We use the file supplied directly by the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) on CD-ROM. This file does not recode the name of an acquired brokerage firm to that of its acquirer for years before the merger.

¹² The electronic availability of x-17a-5 filings is very limited prior to 1994, the year the SEC first mandated electronic form filing. Hence, we do not search for revenue information prior to 1994.

¹³ We exclude a small number of firm-years in which the total revenue is negative (for example, because of losses from proprietary trading).

are able to match in this fashion 110,493 I/B/E/S recommendations issued by 4,089 analysts.

All broker-dealer firms are required to publicly disclose their balance sheets as part of their x-17a-5 filings. But a private broker-dealer firm can withhold the public disclosure of its income statement, which contains the revenue breakdown information needed for this study, if the SEC deems that such disclosure would harm the firm's competitive position. Thus, our sample of private securities firms is limited to broker-dealers that disclose their revenue breakdowns in x-17a-5 filings. We examine whether this selection bias affects our main results by separately analyzing the subsample of publicly traded securities firms, for which public disclosure of annual revenue information is mandatory. Our findings do not appear to be affected by this selection bias. All of our results for the subsample of publicly traded securities firms are qualitatively similar to the results for the full sample reported in the article. In the Appendix, we describe the characteristics of disclosing and nondisclosing private securities firms, shed some light on the firms' income statement disclosure decisions, and use a selectivity-corrected probit model to examine whether the resulting selection bias can explain analysts' response to conflicts in these private firms. We find no evidence that selection bias affects our results for these firms.

3.2. *Characteristics of Analysts, Their Employers, and Companies Followed*

We next measure characteristics of analysts, their employers, and the companies they cover. Prior research (for example, Clement 1999; Jacob, Lys, and Neale 1999) finds that analysts' experience and workloads affect the accuracy and credibility of their research. Using the I/B/E/S Detail History files, we measure an analyst's experience and workloads in terms of all research activity reported in I/B/E/S, including stock recommendations, quarterly and annual earnings-per-share forecasts, and long-term earnings growth forecasts. We measure general research experience as the number of days since an analyst first issued research on any company in the I/B/E/S database and company-specific research experience as the number of days since an analyst first issued research on a particular company. We measure an analyst's workload as the number of different companies or the number of different four-digit I/B/E/S sector industry groups (S/I/Gs)¹⁴ for which the analyst issued research in a given calendar year.

The amount of resources devoted to investment research within brokerage houses also affects the quality of analysts' research (Clement 1999). Larger houses have access to better technology, information, and support staff. Accordingly, we use three measures of brokerage house size: the number of analysts issuing stock recommendations for a brokerage house over the course of a calendar year, book value of total assets, and net sales. All of our subsequent results are qual-

¹⁴ The I/B/E/S sector industry group numbers are six-digit codes that provide information on the industry sectors and subsectors for companies in the I/B/E/S database. We use the first four digits, which correspond to broad industry groupings.

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Table 1
Revenue Sources (%) of Analysts' Employers

| Recommendation Level | Investment Banking | | Brokerage Commission | | Sample Size |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|--------|----------------------|--------|-------------|
| | Mean | Median | Mean | Median | |
| 5 (Strong buy) | 13.94 | 11.81 | 29.87 | 24.09 | 28,901 |
| 4 (Buy) | 13.81 | 11.21 | 26.68 | 17.22 | 37,478 |
| 3 (Hold) | 12.68 | 11.13 | 28.44 | 24.07 | 37,883 |
| 2 (Sell) | 11.61 | 10.55 | 23.13 | 16.12 | 4,875 |
| 1 (Strong sell) | 16.27 | 14.90 | 33.44 | 24.95 | 1,356 |
| p-Value (4 and 5) versus (1 and 2) | .0000 | .0000 | .0000 | .0023 | |

Note. Shown are the percentages of analyst employer revenues from investment banking and brokerage commissions, by recommendation level. Data are for 110,493 stock recommendations and are drawn from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System U.S. Detail Recommendations History file for 1994–2003.

itatively similar under each of the three size measures. To save space, we report results only of tests based on the first size measure.

To capture the degree to which investors believe that individual analysts have skill in providing timely and accurate research, we use two measures of analysts' reputation. The first is based on *Institutional Investor (II)* magazine's All-America Research Team designation. Each year around October 15, *II* mails an issue to subscribers that lists the names of analysts who receive the most votes in a poll of institutional money managers. About 300–400 analysts are identified. We construct a variable that indicates, for each recommendation revision, whether the recommending analyst was named to the first, second, third, or honorable mention team in the latest annual survey. As a complementary, objective measure of analysts' reputation, we use a variable based on the *Wall Street Journal's (WSJ's)* annual All-Star Analysts Survey. The *WSJ* All-Star Analysts are determined by an explicit set of criteria relating to past stock-picking performance and forecasting accuracy.¹⁵ The survey covers about 50 industries annually and names the top five stock pickers and top five earnings forecasters in each industry.¹⁶

Tables 1 and 2 report summary data on the characteristics of our sample. In Table 1, both the mean and the median percentages of analyst employer revenues derived from IB decline monotonically over the first four recommendation levels, but these values are the highest for strong sell recommendations. Similarly, it is the brokerage firms issuing strong sell recommendations that generally derive

¹⁵ We recognize that the performance metrics used in the *Wall Street Journal (WSJ)* All-Star Analysts Survey are public information and can, in principle, be replicated by investors. However, to the extent that computing and evaluating analysts' performance is a costly activity, being named an All-Star Analyst can still affect an analyst's reputation and credibility.

¹⁶ Since the I/B/E/S Broker Translation File provides only analysts' last names and first initials, in some instances it is not possible to ascertain from the I/B/E/S data alone whether an analyst in our sample was named to the *Institutional Investor (II)* or *WSJ* team. For these cases, we determine team membership of analysts from NASD BrokerCheck, an online database (<http://www.nasd.com>, accessed October 2004) that provides the full names of registered securities professionals as well as their employment and registration histories for the past 10 years. The database also keeps track of analysts' name changes (such as those resulting from marriage).

Table 2
Characteristics of Analysts, Firms, and Companies Followed

| Characteristic | Mean | Median | SD | Sample Size |
|--|----------|----------|-----------|-------------|
| Investment banking revenue (%) | 13.60 | 11.25 | 11.93 | 94,892 |
| Brokerage commission revenue (%) | 28.74 | 24.07 | 24.75 | 94,892 |
| Analyst's company-specific experience (years) | 2.42 | 1.20 | 3.29 | 85,531 |
| Analyst's general experience (years) | 6.41 | 4.90 | 5.32 | 85,531 |
| Analysts employed by a firm | 86.34 | 60 | 79.73 | 94,618 |
| Companies followed by an analyst | 17.24 | 15 | 12.93 | 84,016 |
| Four-digit I/B/E/S S/I/Gs followed by an analyst | 3.05 | 3 | 1.90 | 84,014 |
| <i>Institutional Investor</i> All-America stock picker | .005 | 0 | .07 | 85,531 |
| <i>Institutional Investor</i> All-America Research Team member | .035 | 0 | .18 | 85,531 |
| <i>Wall Street Journal</i> All-Star stock picker | .018 | 0 | .13 | 85,531 |
| <i>Wall Street Journal</i> All-Star Analyst | .136 | 0 | .34 | 85,531 |
| Market capitalization (\$ millions) | 8,804.46 | 1,367.22 | 27,758.81 | 81,333 |
| Analyst following | 9.14 | 7 | 6.88 | 92,869 |

Note. Data are for 94,892 recommendation revisions and are drawn from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) U.S. Detail Recommendations History file for 1994–2003. Recommendation revisions include recommendation changes as well as initiations, resumptions, and discontinuations of coverage. Analysts' experience is measured from all analyst research activity reported in I/B/E/S, including earnings-per-share forecasts, long-term earnings growth forecasts, and stock recommendations. An analyst is considered to be a top stock picker or team member if he or she appeared in the relevant portion of the most recent analyst survey by *Institutional Investor* or the *Wall Street Journal* at the time of a recommendation revision. Market capitalization is measured 12 months before the end of the current month, and analyst following is measured on the basis of stock recommendation coverage. Market capitalization values are inflation adjusted (with Consumer Price Index numbers and with 2003 as the base year). S/I/G = sector industry group.

the highest percentage of their total revenues from brokerage commissions. Notably, in each of the five categories, the mean percentage of revenue from commissions is about twice as large as the mean percentage of revenue from IB. This fact underscores the importance of trading commissions as a source of revenue for many securities firms. The last column shows that about 95 percent of the recommendations in the sample are at levels 5 (strong buy), 4 (buy), or 3 (hold). Levels 1 (strong sell) and 2 (sell) represent only about 1 percent and 4 percent of all recommendations, respectively.

The data in Table 2 provide a flavor of our sample of analysts and their employers. As noted by Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000), careers as analysts tend to be relatively short. The median recommendation is made by an analyst with under 5 years of experience, of which just over a year was spent following a given stock. Stock analysts tend to be highly specialized, following a handful of companies in a few industries. The median recommendation is made by an analyst following 15 companies in three industries who works for a securities firm employing 60 analysts. Being named as an All-America Research Team member by *II* is a rare honor, received by under 5 percent of all analysts in our sample. Finally, the typical company followed is large, with mean (median) market capitalization of about \$8.8 billion (\$1.4 billion) in inflation-adjusted

2003 dollars. Over the time span of a year, a company is tracked by a mean (median) of 9.1 (7) analysts.

4. Conflicts and the Levels of Analyst Recommendations Net of the Consensus

In this section, we examine whether the level of an analyst's stock recommendation net of the consensus (that is, median) recommendation level is related to the conflicts that he or she faces. We start by ascertaining the level of the outstanding recommendation on each stock by each analyst following it at the end of each quarter (March, June, September, December) from 1995 through 2003. An analyst's recommendation on a stock is included only if it is newly issued, reiterated, or revised in the preceding 12 months.

We estimate a regression explaining individual analysts' net stock recommendation levels at the end of a quarter (which is the recommendation level minus the median recommendation level across all analysts following a stock during the quarter).¹⁷ The regression pools observations across analysts, stocks, and quarters and includes our two main explanatory variables: the percentage of an analyst employer's total revenues from IB and the percentage from brokerage commissions. Following Jegadeesh et al. (2004) and Kadan et al. (forthcoming), who find that momentum is an important determinant of analysts' recommendations, we control for the prior 6-month stock return.

The regression also controls for other factors that can affect the degree of analysts' optimism, such as the size of the company followed and the resources, reputation, experience, and workload of an analyst. As a measure of the resources available to an analyst, a dummy variable is used for a large brokerage house, and it equals one if the firm ranks in the top quartile of all houses in terms of the number of analysts employed during the year. The size of the company followed is measured by the natural logarithm of its market capitalization, measured 12 months before the end of the month. We measure an analyst's reputation by dummy variables that equal one if the recommending analyst was named in the most recent year as an All-America Research Team member by *II* or as an All-Star Analyst by the *WSJ*. An analyst's company-specific research experience is measured by the natural logarithm of one plus the number of days an analyst has been producing research (including earnings-per-share forecasts, long-term growth forecasts, or stock recommendations) on the company. We measure an analyst's workload by the natural logarithm of one plus the number of companies for which he or she produces forecasts or recommendations in the current year.

Finally, we control for industry and time period effects by adding dummy variables for I/B/E/S two-digit S/I/G industries and for each calendar quarter (March 1995, June 1995, and so forth). Since net recommendation levels can

¹⁷ To ensure meaningful variation in the dependent variable, we omit stocks followed by only one analyst in a quarter.

Table 3
Ordered Probit Analysis of Recommendation Levels Net of the Consensus

| Explanatory Variable | Coefficient | z-Statistic |
|---|-------------|-------------|
| Investment banking revenue (%) | .4167 | 17.35 |
| Brokerage commission revenue (%) | .0363 | 3.00 |
| Prior 6-month stock return | -.0068 | -2.89 |
| Large brokerage house dummy | -.0639 | -8.60 |
| Company size | .0038 | 2.89 |
| <i>Institutional Investor</i> All-America Research Team dummy | .0032 | .15 |
| <i>Wall Street Journal</i> All-Star Analyst dummy | -.0196 | -2.23 |
| Company-specific research experience | .0012 | 1.42 |
| Number of companies followed | .0070 | 4.64 |

Note. The results are from ordered probit regressions explaining individual analysts' stock recommendation levels net of the consensus (that is, median) recommendation level at the end of each quarter (March, June, September, December) for 1995–2003. Observations are excluded if the analyst issued no new or revised recommendation in the preceding 12 months. The regression includes observations pooled across analysts, stocks, and quarters. Data on recommendations are drawn from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) U.S. Detail Recommendations History file for 1994–2003. Investment banking or brokerage commission revenue refer to the percentage of the brokerage firm's total revenues derived from investment banking or brokerage commissions. The large brokerage house dummy is an indicator variable that equals one if a brokerage house is in the top quartile of all houses, based on the number of analysts issuing stock recommendations listed in I/B/E/S in a given calendar year. Company size is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the company followed, measured 12 months prior to the end of the current month. The *Institutional Investor* All-America Research Team and *Wall Street Journal* All-Star Analyst dummies are indicator variables that equal one if the recommending analyst was listed as an All-America Research Team member or All-Star Analyst in the most recent analyst ranking. Company-specific research experience is the natural log of one plus the number of days that an analyst has been issuing I/B/E/S research on a company. Number of companies followed equals the natural log of one plus the number of companies followed by an analyst in the current calendar year. The regression includes dummy variables for two-digit I/B/E/S sector industry group industries and for calendar quarters. Test statistics are based on a robust variance estimator. The number of observations is 213,011; the p -value of the χ^2 test is <.0001.

take ordered values from -4 (strongly pessimistic) to 4 (strongly optimistic) in increments of $.5$, we estimate the regression as an ordered probit model.¹⁸ The Z-statistics are based on a robust (Huber-White sandwich) variance estimator.

Table 3 shows the regression estimate. The coefficients of IB revenue percentage and commission revenue percentage are both positive. This finding implies that greater conflicts with IB and brokerage businesses lead an analyst to issue a higher recommendation on a stock relative to the consensus. Stocks followed by busier analysts and stocks of larger companies receive higher recommendations relative to the consensus. Stocks that experience a price run-up over the prior 6 months, stocks followed by analysts at large brokerage houses, and stocks followed by *WSJ* All-Star Analysts all receive lower recommendations relative to the consensus. All of these relations are highly statistically significant.

To provide a sense of the magnitude of the main effects of interest, we show in Table 4 the derivatives of the probability of each net recommendation level

¹⁸ Notice that recommendation levels can take integer values from 1 to 5, and the median recommendation can take values from 1 to 5 in increments of $.5$. See Greene (2003) for a detailed exposition of the ordered probit model.

Table 4
Marginal Effects and Sample Distribution for the Ordered Probit Regression in Table 3

| | Recommendation Level Net of the Consensus | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|---|---------|---------|---------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|--------|
| | -4 | -3.5 | -3 | -2.5 | -2 | -1.5 | -1 | -.5 | 0 | .5 | 1 | 1.5 | 2 | 2.5 | 3 |
| Investment banking revenue (%) | -.00031 | -.00002 | -.00026 | -.0010 | -.0199 | -.0086 | -.0744 | -.0321 | .0123 | .0325 | .0671 | .0077 | .0188 | .0002 | .0003 |
| Brokerage commission revenue (%) | -.00003 | -.00001 | -.0002 | -.00009 | -.0017 | -.0008 | -.0065 | -.0028 | .0011 | .0028 | .0059 | .0007 | .0016 | .00002 | .00003 |
| Observed frequency | .0001 | .0001 | .0016 | .0007 | .0176 | .0094 | .1241 | .0948 | .4940 | .0937 | .1289 | .0111 | .0233 | .0002 | .0003 |

Note. Shown is the derivative of the probability of each net recommendation level with respect to investment banking or brokerage revenue percentage, estimated from the ordered probit regression in Table 3. Investment banking and brokerage commission revenue refer to the percentage of the brokerage firm's total revenues derived from investment banking and brokerage commissions. The last row shows observed frequency of each net recommendation level as a proportion of the sample of 213,011 observations.

with respect to IB revenue and commission revenue percentages.¹⁹ Thus, for example, a 1-standard-deviation increase in IB revenue percentage increases the probability of an optimistic recommendation (that is, a net recommendation level greater than zero) by $.1193 \times (.0325 + .0671 + . . . + .0003) = .0151$. Compared to the unconditional probability of an optimistic recommendation by an analyst, this represents an increase of about 5.9 percent $(.0151/.2575)$. The effect of a change in commission revenue percentage is much smaller. A 1-standard-deviation increase in commission revenue percentage increases the probability of an optimistic recommendation by $.2475 \times .01105 = .0027$, or about 1 percent $(.0027/.2575)$ of the unconditional probability. Thus, despite possible concerns about a loss of reputation, analysts seem to respond to conflicts of interest, particularly those stemming from IB.

5. Conflicts and Investor Response to Recommendation Revisions

5.1 Stock Price Response

This section examines whether an analyst's credibility with investors is related to the degree of conflict faced. We interpret the reaction of stock prices to a recommendation revision as an indication of an analyst's credibility. Our analysis focuses on revisions in recommendation levels, rather than on recommendation levels per se, because revisions are discrete events that are likely to be salient for investors, and previous research finds that revisions have significant information content (see, for example, Womack 1996; Jegadeesh et al. 2004). To capture the effects of the most commonly observed and economically important types of revisions, we structure our tests around four basic categories: added to strong buy, added to buy or strong buy, dropped from strong buy, and dropped from buy or strong buy.²⁰ These four categories are defined to include initiations, resumptions, and discontinuations of coverage because such events also reflect analysts' positive or negative views about a company.²¹ Thus, for example, we consider a stock to be added to strong buy under two scenarios: (a) the recommendation level is raised to strong buy from a lower level or (b) coverage is

¹⁹ Notice that, for each explanatory variable, these derivatives sum to zero across all the net recommendation levels.

²⁰ Our analysis focuses on these four types of revisions instead of the other four (added to strong sell, and so forth) because, as shown in Table 1, sell and strong sell recommendations are quite rare. But note that dropped-from-buy and dropped-from-buy-or-strong-buy revisions can entail movement to the sell or strong sell category.

²¹ We use the I/B/E/S Stopped Recommendations file to determine instances in which a brokerage firm discontinued coverage of a company. This file contains numerous cases in which an analyst stops coverage of a stock only to issue a new recommendation a month or two later. Conversations with I/B/E/S representatives indicate that such events likely represent pauses in coverage due to company quiet periods or analysts' reassignments within a brokerage house. We define a stopped coverage event to be a true stoppage only if the analyst does not issue a recommendation on the stock over the subsequent 6 months.

initiated or resumed at the level of strong buy.²² Defining revisions in this fashion yields a sample of 94,892 recommendation revisions made over the 1994–2003 period.

5.1.1. Average Response

We compute the abnormal return on an upgraded or downgraded stock over day t as the return (including dividends) on the stock minus the return on the Center for Research in Security Prices equal-weighted market portfolio of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ stocks. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) on the stock over days t_1 to t_2 relative to the revision date (day 0) is measured as the sum of the abnormal returns over those days. Table 5 shows mean and median CARs for three windows: days -1 to 0 , -1 to 1 , and -5 to 5 . The t -statistics for the difference of the mean abnormal returns from zero are computed as in Brown and Warner (1985) and are shown in parentheses. The p -values for the Wilcoxon test are reported in parentheses with the medians.

It is clear from Table 5 that recommendation revisions have large effects on stock prices. For example, when a stock is added to the strong-buy list, it experiences a mean abnormal return of about 2 percent over the 2-day revision period. Downgrades have even larger effects on stock prices than do upgrades. Strikingly, the 2-day mean abnormal return around the dropped-from-strong-buy list is -4 percent. Median values are consistently smaller in magnitude than are means, and this finding indicates that some revisions lead to price reactions of a very large magnitude. Mean and median 2-day abnormal returns are statistically different from zero for all four groups of forecast revisions. The magnitudes of abnormal returns are somewhat larger over the 3-day and 11-day windows than over the 2-day window. Overall, these returns are consistent with those found by prior research that examines the average stock price impact of recommendation revisions (for example, Womack 1996; Jegadeesh et al. 2004).

5.1.2. Cross-Sectional Analysis

Table 6 contains cross-sectional regressions of stock price reactions to recommendation revisions over days -1 to 1 . The main explanatory variables of interest in these regressions are our revenue-based measures of the magnitudes of IB and brokerage conflicts. We include controls for the size of an analyst's employer, the size of the company followed, and measures of an analyst's reputation, experience, and workload.²³ We estimate a separate regression for each

²² Note that the definitions of our four recommendation revision groups imply that stocks can be added to a group more than once on a given day. Nonetheless, excluding days on which a stock experiences multiple revisions does not change any of our qualitative results.

²³ Prior research finds that analysts who have more experience, carry lower workloads, or are employed by larger firms tend to generate more precise research (see, for example, Clement 1999; Jacob, Lys, and Neale 1999; Mikhail, Walther, and Willis 1997). In addition, more reputed analysts tend to generate timelier and more accurate research (see, for example, Stickel 1992; Hong and Kubik 2003). We expect such analysts to be more influential with investors.

Table 5
Cumulative Abnormal Returns surrounding Revisions in Analyst Stock Recommendations

| Recommendation Revision | Days -1 to 0 | | | Days -1 to 1 | | | Days -5 to 5 | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|----------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|----------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|----------|
| | Mean (<i>t</i> -Statistic) | Median (<i>p</i> -Value) | <i>N</i> | Mean (<i>t</i> -Statistic) | Median (<i>p</i> -Value) | <i>N</i> | Mean (<i>t</i> -Statistic) | Median (<i>p</i> -Value) | <i>N</i> |
| Upgrades: | | | | | | | | | |
| Added to strong buy | .0207 (49.53)* | .0109 (.000) | 24,560 | .0240 (46.89)* | .0130 (.000) | 24,556 | .0263 (26.84)* | .0187 (.000) | 24,499 |
| Added to buy or strong buy | .0149 (46.47)* | .0071 (.000) | 36,879 | .0165 (42.01)* | .0085 (.000) | 36,875 | .0207 (27.53)* | .0128 (.000) | 36,780 |
| Downgrades: | | | | | | | | | |
| Dropped from buy or strong buy | -.0337 (-56.21)* | -.0126 (.000) | 33,322 | -.0358 (-48.75)* | -.0155 (.000) | 33,262 | -.0491 (-34.92)* | -.0287 (.000) | 33,197 |
| Dropped from strong buy | -.0399 (-49.88)* | -.0153 (.000) | 22,825 | -.0427 (-43.58)* | -.0183 (.000) | 22,795 | -.0570 (-30.38)* | -.0326 (.000) | 22,767 |

Note. The sample of recommendation revisions is drawn from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) U.S. Detail Recommendations History file for 1994–2003. Recommendation revisions include recommendation changes and initiations, resumptions, and discontinuations in coverage. Day 0 is the revision date. Recommendation revisions are classified according to the level of any existing recommendation and whether coverage is being initiated or dropped. For example, a revision by an analyst is classified as added to strong buy if the new recommendation is strong buy and (a) the previous recommendation was lower than strong buy or (b) analyst coverage by the brokerage house is resumed or initiated. A recommendation is classified as dropped from strong buy if the previous recommendation was strong buy and (a) the new recommendation is lower than strong buy or (b) research coverage on the company is stopped. The *t*-statistics for the difference from zero are computed as in Brown and Warner (1985). The *p*-values for the difference from zero are from a Wilcoxon test.

* Statistically significant at the 1% level in two-tailed tests.

Table 6
Cross-Sectional Regressions of Cumulative Abnormal Returns over Days -1 to +1 surrounding Recommendation Revisions

| Explanatory Variable | Added to Strong Buy | Added to Buy or Strong Buy | Dropped from Buy or Strong Buy | Dropped from Strong Buy |
|---|----------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Intercept | .0369 (7.66)** | .0412 (11.21)** | -.2294 (-31.31)** | -.2224 (-29.25)** |
| Investment banking revenue (%) | -.0262 (-5.65)** | -.0139 (-3.57)** | -.0200 (-2.74)** | -.0354 (-3.92)** |
| Brokerage commission revenue (%) | -.0187 (-6.51)** | -.0148 (-6.43)** | -.0089 (-2.39)* | -.0013 (-.29) |
| Large brokerage house dummy | .0116 (7.46)** | .0088 (6.88)** | -.0242 (-12.79)** | -.0220 (-10.25)** |
| Company size | -.0056 (-16.13)** | -.0041 (-15.40)** | -.0004 (-.97) | .0018 (3.77)** |
| <i>Institutional Investor</i> All-America Research Team dummy | .0159 (4.11)** | .0122 (3.82)** | -.0148 (-2.93)** | -.0207 (-3.28)** |
| <i>Wall Street Journal</i> All-Star Analyst dummy | .0015 (.81) | .0013 (.84) | -.0011 (-.48) | .0045 (1.78) |
| Company-specific research experience | .0017 (8.42)** | .0019 (12.49)** | .0039 (7.37)** | .0018 (3.21)** |
| Number of companies followed | -.0012 (-2.97)** | -.0016 (-5.37)** | .0007 (1.49) | .0008 (1.31) |
| Observations | 19,440 | 28,665 | 28,618 | 19,632 |
| Adjusted R ² | .038 | .0240 | .028 | .035 |
| P-Value of F-test | <.0001 | <.0001 | <.0001 | <.0001 |

Note. Shown are coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) *t*-statistics from ordinary least squares regressions. Day 0 is the recommendation revision date. Data on recommendations are drawn from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) U.S. Detail Recommendations History file for 1994–2003. Investment banking and brokerage commission revenue refer to the percentages of a brokerage firm's total revenues derived from investment banking and brokerage commissions. The large brokerage house dummy is an indicator variable that equals one if a brokerage house is in the top quartile of all houses, based on the number of analysts issuing stock recommendations listed in I/B/E/S in a given calendar year. Company size is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the company followed, measured 12 months prior to the end of the current month. The *Institutional Investor* All-America Research Team and *Wall Street Journal* All-Star Analyst dummies are indicator variables that equal one if the recommending analyst was listed as an All-America Research Team member or All-Star Analyst in the most recent analyst ranking. Company-specific research experience is the natural log of one plus the number of days that an analyst has been issuing I/B/E/S research on a company. Number of companies followed equals the natural log of one plus the number of companies followed by an analyst in the current calendar year. All regressions include dummy variables for calendar-year and two-digit I/B/E/S sector industry group industries (not reported). The *t*-statistics are based on a robust variance estimator.

* Statistically significant at the 5% level in two-tailed tests.

** Statistically significant at the 1% level in two-tailed tests.

of the four groups of recommendation revisions. The *t*-statistics based on a robust variance estimator are reported in parentheses.

The coefficient on IB revenue percentage is statistically significantly negative for both upgrades and downgrades. The coefficient on brokerage commission revenue percentage is also negative in all four regressions; it is statistically significant in all cases, except for the dropped-from-strong-buy revisions.²⁴ Collectively, these results favor the rational discounting hypothesis over the naive investor hypothesis. The magnitudes of these effects are nontrivial. For instance, a 1-standard-deviation increase in IB revenue percentage leads to a change of about $-.31$ ($-.42$) percentage points in the 3-day abnormal return around the move to (from) a strong buy recommendation. Similarly, a 1-standard-deviation increase in brokerage commission revenue percentage leads to a change of about $-.37$ ($-.22$) percentage points in the corresponding abnormal return around the move to (from) a buy or strong buy recommendation.²⁵

The results for control variables are also noteworthy. The dummy variable for a large analyst employer is positively (negatively) related to the market reaction to upgrades (downgrades). This finding is consistent with the idea that revisions by analysts employed at larger brokerage houses (which tend to be more reputable) have more credibility with investors. The size of the company followed is negatively (positively) related to the market reaction to upgrades (downgrades), which is consistent with the notion that, for larger companies, an analyst's recommendation competes with more alternative sources of information and advice.

Revisions by *II* All-America Research Team analysts are positively (negatively) related to the stock price reaction to upgrades (downgrades), which suggests that they wield more influence with investors. This is a notable finding; we are unaware of previous work documenting a relation between an analyst's reputation and the stock price reaction to both upgrades and downgrades. As the coefficient on the *WSJ* All-Star Analyst dummy indicates, however, being designated as a *WSJ* All-Star Analyst does not seem to enhance the credibility of an analyst's recommendations.²⁶ The absence of an effect here is somewhat

²⁴ These and all subsequent regression results in this article are qualitatively similar when we winsorize the dependent variable at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles of its distribution.

²⁵ For each group of revisions (such as added to strong buy), we also estimate the regression after excluding similar revision events that a stock experiences within 3 days of a given revision event. These results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 6 and 8. We also examine the possibility that investors perceived the conflicts to be more severe, and hence discounted them more, in securities firms that were charged by regulators (that is, the 10 firms that were part of the global analyst settlement) than in other firms. We do this by interacting both investment banking (IB) revenue percentage and brokerage commission revenue percentage variables in the regression with binary (0, 1) dummy variables for securities firms that are part of the global analyst settlement and firms that are not. We find no significant differences between the two groups of firms in their coefficients on IB revenue percentage and commission revenue percentage.

²⁶ Although *II* All-America Research Team and *WSJ* All-Star Analyst dummies both measure aspects of an analyst's reputation, they are not highly correlated. The correlation coefficient is .14 across all upgrades and .13 across all downgrades.

surprising given that the *WSJ* has a much broader readership base than that of *II*. One explanation is that *II* analyst rankings are based on an opinion poll of money managers, who control substantial assets and therefore directly affect stock prices, while *WSJ* rankings are based on strictly quantitative measures of analysts' past stock-picking or forecasting performance.

The market reaction to upgrades is positively related to an analyst's company-specific research experience. This finding suggests that more experienced analysts tend to be more influential with investors. But the reaction to downgrades is also positively related to analysts' experience. Finally, the stock price reaction to upgrades is negatively related to analysts' workload. This finding suggests that busier analysts' opinions tend to get discounted by the market. All of these relations are statistically significant.

5.2. Response of Trading Volume

In this section, we measure analysts' credibility via changes in the volume of trade around recommendation revisions.²⁷ Revisions of analysts' recommendations can affect trading volumes by inducing investors to rebalance their portfolios to reflect updated beliefs.

5.2.1. Average Response

We compute the abnormal volume for a trading day t as the mean-adjusted share turnover for stock i .²⁸

$$e_{it} = v_{it} - v_i, \quad (1)$$

where v_{it} is the trading volume of stock i over day t divided by common shares outstanding on day t and v_i is the mean of v_{it} over days -35 to -6 .

The cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) for stock i over days t_1 to t_2 is measured in the following way:

$$CAV^i_{t_1, t_2} = \sum_{t=t_1}^{t_2} e_{it}. \quad (2)$$

Table 7 shows mean and median CAV values over three windows surrounding revisions in analyst stock recommendations. Over the 2-day revision period, the mean abnormal volume is positive for both upgrades and downgrades, but its magnitude is substantially larger for downgrades. The move to (from) the strong-buy list increases a stock's trading volume by a mean of about .9 percent (2.6 percent) of the outstanding shares, compared to a normal day's volume. For longer windows, the mean abnormal volumes are substantially higher for down-

²⁷ Many prior studies have used trading volume to examine investors' response to informational events (see, for example, Shleifer 1986; Jain 1988; Jarrell and Poulsen 1989; Meulbroek 1992; Sanders and Zdanowicz 1992).

²⁸ This approach has been used in a number of prior studies (for example, Shleifer 1986; Vijh 1994; Michaely and Vila 1996).

Table 7
Cumulative Abnormal Trading Volumes surrounding Announcements of Revisions in Stock Recommendations by Analysts

| Recommendation revision | Days -1 to 0 | | | Days -1 to 1 | | | Days -5 to 5 | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|----------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|----------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|----------|
| | Mean (<i>t</i> -Statistic) | Median (<i>p</i> -Value) | <i>N</i> | Mean (<i>t</i> -Statistic) | Median (<i>p</i> -Value) | <i>N</i> | Mean (<i>t</i> -Statistic) | Median (<i>p</i> -Value) | <i>N</i> |
| Upgrades: | | | | | | | | | |
| Added to strong buy | .0086 (8.89)* | .0011 (.000) | 24,506 | .0097 (8.18)* | .0015 (.000) | 24,502 | .0071 (3.13)* | .0030 (.000) | 24,488 |
| Added to buy or strong buy | .0053 (5.08)* | .0002 (.000) | 36,800 | .0058 (4.54)* | .0004 (.000) | 36,796 | .0020 (.818) | .0008 (.000) | 36,766 |
| Downgrades: | | | | | | | | | |
| Dropped from buy or strong buy | .0217 (114.47)* | .0010 (.000) | 33,291 | .0265 (114.14)* | .0014 (.000) | 33,232 | .0381 (85.70)* | .0039 (.000) | 33,175 |
| Dropped from strong buy | .0259 (128.76)* | .0017 (.000) | 22,808 | .0315 (127.86)* | .0025 (.000) | 22,779 | .0453 (96.03)* | .0057 (.000) | 22,756 |

Note. The abnormal volume for stock *i* on day *t* is computed from daily Center for Research in Security Prices data as $e_{it} = v_{it} - v_i$, where v_{it} is the volume on day *t* and v_i is the average volume over days -35 to -6 relative to the recommendation revision date (day 0). All share volumes are normalized by dividing by common shares outstanding on the same day. The *p*-values are from a Wilcoxon test.

* Statistically significant at the 1% level in two-tailed tests.

grades. The median values are lower than the mean values. Each mean and median abnormal volume is statistically greater than zero, with a p -value below .01. Clearly, revisions of stock recommendations by analysts generate trading.

5.2.2. Cross-Sectional Analysis

Table 8 presents cross-sectional regressions explaining CAVs over days -1 to 1 surrounding the recommendation revisions. The explanatory variables in the regressions are the same as in regressions of CARs in Section 5.1.2. The results provide strong support for the rational discounting hypothesis. The coefficients on both the IB revenue percentage and commission revenue percentage variables are generally statistically significant and negative (positive) for both groups of upgrades (downgrades). The magnitudes of these effects are nontrivial. For example, a 1-standard-deviation increase in IB revenue percentage leads to a change in the 3-day abnormal volume around the addition (omission) of a stock to (from) the strong-buy list of about $-.12$ percent (.36 percent) of the outstanding shares; a corresponding change in the commission revenue percentage results in a change in the abnormal volume of about $-.15$ percent (.22 percent).

Recommendation revisions by larger brokerage houses generate more trading. The abnormal volume is also larger for revisions involving smaller companies. Revisions by *II* All-America Research Team members generate statistically significantly more abnormal volume for the dropped from buy or strong-buy group. Upgrades (downgrades) by more experienced analysts result in larger (smaller) abnormal volumes, and upgrades by busier analysts are less credible.

6. Conflicts and the Performance of Recommendation Revisions

We next consider the investment performance of analysts' recommendation revisions over periods of up to 12 months. Here, the choice of the benchmark used to compute abnormal returns is somewhat more important than it is in Section 5.1, where we measure abnormal returns over a few days around the revision. But the results here are likely to be less sensitive to the benchmark employed than are those in studies of long-run stock performance, where the time period of interest can be as long as 5–10 years (see, for example, Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker 1992; Agrawal and Jaffe 2003).

6.1. Average Performance

We use an approach similar to Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007). To evaluate the performance of stocks over a given window, say, months 1–12 following the month of their inclusion (month 0) in a given group of revisions such as the added-to-strong-buy list, we form a portfolio p that initially invests \$1 in each recommendation. Each recommended stock remains in the portfolio until month 12 or the month that the stock is either downgraded or dropped from coverage by the securities firm, whichever is earlier. If multiple securities firms recommend a stock in a given month, the stock appears multiple times in the

Table 8
Cross-Sectional Regressions of Cumulative Abnormal Trading Volumes over Days -1 to +1 surrounding Recommendation Revisions

| Explanatory Variable | Added to Strong Buy | Added to Buy or Strong Buy | Dropped from Buy or Strong Buy | Dropped from Strong Buy |
|---|---------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Intercept | .0083 (2.65)** | .0042 (1.90) | .0946 (13.72)** | .0828 (15.01)** |
| Investment banking revenue (%) | -.0100 (-3.31)** | -.0085 (-2.26)* | .0140 (2.18)* | .0304 (3.63)** |
| Brokerage commission revenue (%) | -.0057 (-1.76) | -.0059 (-4.13)** | .0087 (2.76)** | .0055 (1.45) |
| Large brokerage house dummy | .0058 (3.72)** | .0038 (4.50)** | .0168 (11.12)** | .0171 (9.48)** |
| Company size | -.0031 (-9.54)** | -.0018 (-12.30)** | -.0023 (-7.60)** | -.0041 (-11.40)** |
| <i>Institutional Investor</i> All-America Research Team dummy | .0035 (1.74) | .0033 (1.88) | .0084 (2.32)* | .0046 (1.21) |
| <i>Wall Street Journal</i> All-Star Analyst dummy | .0008 (.74) | .0013 (1.42) | .0023 (1.36) | -.0006 (-.29) |
| Company-specific research experience | .0010 (8.39)** | .0010 (11.19)** | -.0041 (-6.18)** | -.0019 (-4.11)** |
| Number of companies followed | -.0009 (-3.49)** | -.0013 (-6.23)** | -.0001 (-.38) | -.0005 (-.99) |
| Observations | 19,431 | 28,653 | 28,594 | 19,619 |
| Adjusted R ² | .025 | .019 | .030 | .042 |
| p-Value of F-test | <.0001 | <.0001 | <.0001 | <.0001 |

Note. Shown are coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) *t*-statistics from ordinary least squares regressions. Day 0 is the recommendation revision date. Data on recommendations are drawn from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) U.S. Detail Recommendations History file for 1994–2003. Investment banking and brokerage commission revenue refer to the percentage of brokerage firm's total revenues derived from investment banking and brokerage commissions. The large brokerage house dummy is an indicator variable that equals one if a brokerage house is in the top quartile of all houses, based on the number of analysts issuing stock recommendations listed in I/B/E/S in a given calendar year. Company size is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the company followed, measured 12 months prior to the end of the current month. The *Institutional Investor* All-America Research Team and *Wall Street Journal* All-Star Analyst dummies are indicator variables that equal one if the recommending analyst was listed as an All-America Research Team member or All-Star Analyst in the most recent analyst ranking. Company-specific research experience is the natural log of one plus the number of days that an analyst has been issuing I/B/E/S research on a company. Number of companies followed equals the natural log of one plus the number of companies followed by an analyst in the current calendar year. All regressions include dummy variables for calendar-year and two-digit I/B/E/S sector industry group industries (not reported). The *t*-statistics are based on a robust variance estimator.

* Statistically significant at the 5% level in two-tailed tests.

** Statistically significant at the 1% level in two-tailed tests.

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portfolio that month, once for each securities firm with a strong buy recommendation. The portfolio return for calendar month t is given by

$$R_{pt} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n_t} x_{it} \times R_{it}}{\sum_{i=1}^{n_t} x_{it}} \quad (3)$$

where R_{it} is the month t return on recommendation i , x_{it} is one plus the compound return on the recommendation from month 1 to month $t - 1$ (that is, x_{it} equals one for a stock that was recommended in month t), and n_t is the number of recommendations in the portfolio. This calculation yields a time series of monthly returns for portfolio p .

We compute the abnormal performance of portfolio p as the estimate of the intercept term α_p from the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. Accordingly, we estimate the following time-series regression for portfolio p :

$$R_{pt} - R_{ft} = \alpha_p + \beta_{1p}(R_{mt} - R_{ft}) + \beta_{2p}\text{SMB}_t + \beta_{3p}\text{HML}_t + \varepsilon_{pt} \quad (4)$$

$t = \text{January 1994 to December 2003,}$

where R_f is the risk-free rate, R_m is the return on the value-weighted market index, SMB equals the monthly return on a portfolio of small firms minus the return on a portfolio of big firms, and HML is the monthly return on a portfolio of firms with high book-to-market ratio minus the return on a portfolio of firms with low book-to-market ratio. The error term in the regression is denoted ε . The time series of monthly returns on $R_m - R_f$, SMB, and HML are obtained from Kenneth French's Web site.²⁹ We repeat this procedure for each time window of interest, such as months 1–3, and for each group of revisions, such as the dropped-from-strong-buy list.

Table 9 shows the performance of analysts' recommendation revisions. Over the period of 3 months following the month of recommendation revision, the average abnormal returns for upgrades are positive, and the returns for downgrades are negative. The magnitudes of these returns are nontrivial. For example, the addition of a stock to the strong-buy list has an abnormal monthly return of about .875 percent, or about 2.62 percent over the 3-month period. The pattern is generally similar over longer windows. For example, over months 1–12, the abnormal monthly return for the added-to-strong-buy list is .679 percent, or about 8.15 percent over the 12-month period. The abnormal returns are significantly different from zero for upgrades in all cases; they are statistically insignificant for downgrades in all cases except one.

²⁹ Kenneth R. French, Fama/French Factors (file F-F_Research_Data_Factors.zip at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html).

Table 9
Medium-Term Investment Performance of Recommendation Revisions

| Portfolio | Months 1–3 | | Months 1–6 | | Months 1–12 | |
|--------------------------------|------------|-------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | Abnormal | | Abnormal | | Abnormal | |
| | Monthly | | Monthly | | Monthly | |
| | Return | t-Statistic | Return | t-Statistic | Return | t-Statistic |
| | (%) | | (%) | | (%) | |
| Added to strong buy | .875 | 6.12** | .758 | 6.12** | .679 | 5.70** |
| Added to buy or strong buy | .586 | 4.49** | .511 | 4.82** | .503 | 5.38** |
| Dropped from buy or strong buy | –.361 | –1.60 | –.260 | –1.28 | –.072 | –.44 |
| Dropped from strong buy | –.367 | –1.58 | –.395 | –2.00* | –.231 | –1.49 |

Note. Abnormal returns are reported for three event windows relative to the month of revision (month 0) and are computed using an approach similar to that in Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007). The abnormal return is the estimated intercept from a time-series regression of 114 monthly portfolio returns using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model.

* Statistically significant at the 5% level in two-tailed tests.

** Statistically significant at the 1% level in two-tailed tests.

6.2. Cross-Sectional Analysis

Table 10 shows the results of a regression similar to that in Section 5.1.2, except that the dependent variable here is the average monthly abnormal return for a firm over months 1–12 following the month of a recommendation revision. We compute this abnormal return by estimating a time-series regression similar to that in equation (4) over months 1–12 for each stock in a sample of recommendation revisions. The intercept from this regression is our estimate of the performance of the recommendation revision. Observations involving recommendation revisions on a stock that occur within 12 months of an earlier revision are omitted from each regression.³⁰

In each regression result reported in Table 10, the coefficients of IB revenue percentage and commission revenue percentage are not statistically significantly different from zero. These results favor the rational discounting hypothesis, at least for the marginal investor. The performance of both groups of recommendation upgrades is negatively related to company size; the performance of one group of downgrades is positively related to the dummy variable for *WSJ All-Star Analysts*. None of the other variables is statistically significant.

7. Bubble versus Postbubble Periods

We next exploit the fact that our sample spans both the late-1990s U.S. stock bubble and a postbubble period. During the bubble period, initial public offerings, merger activities, and stock prices were near record highs, and media attention was focused on analysts' pronouncements. We therefore examine whether analysts' behavior and investors' responses to analysts' recommendations differed during the bubble and postbubble periods. Given the euphoria on Wall

³⁰ The results are qualitatively similar when we include these observations.

Table 10
Cross-Sectional Regressions of Average Monthly Abnormal Returns following Recommendation Revisions over Months 1–12

| Explanatory Variable | Added to Strong Buy | Added to Buy or Strong Buy | Dropped from Buy or Strong Buy | Dropped from Strong Buy |
|---|------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Intercept | .0523 (1.81) | .0089 (.49) | -.0646 (-6.81)** | -.0821 (-6.55)** |
| Investment banking revenue (%) | -.0089 (-1.23) | -.0018 (-.29) | .0042 (.64) | -.0068 (-.87) |
| Brokerage commission revenue (%) | .0064 (1.32) | .0059 (1.54) | .0057 (1.21) | .0031 (.75) |
| Large brokerage house dummy | .0009 (.38) | -.0027 (-1.32) | .0016 (.72) | .0015 (.77) |
| Company size | -.0013 (-2.74)** | -.0017 (-4.18)** | -.0007 (-1.71) | -.0007 (-1.54) |
| <i>Institutional Investor</i> All-America analyst dummy | -.0029 (-.58) | .0001 (.01) | -.0016 (-.44) | -.0009 (-.23) |
| <i>Wall Street Journal</i> All-Star Analyst dummy | .0031 (1.24) | .0002 (.12) | -.0029 (-1.42) | .0056 (2.29)* |
| Company-specific research experience | .0004 (1.08) | .0004 (1.80) | .0004 (.76) | .0004 (.92) |
| Number of companies followed | -.0011 (-1.61) | -.0008 (-1.79) | -.0002 (-.45) | -.0002 (-.47) |
| Observations | 6,411 | 8,851 | 10,644 | 8,368 |
| Adjusted R ² | .026 | .023 | .019 | .020 |
| p-Value of F-test | <.0001 | <.0001 | <.0001 | <.0001 |

Note. Shown are the coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) *t*-statistics from ordinary least squares regressions. Month 0 is the month of recommendation revision. The abnormal return is the estimated intercept from a time-series regression of monthly portfolio returns in accordance with the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. Data on recommendations are drawn from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) U.S. Detail Recommendations History file for 1994–2003. Investment banking and brokerage commission revenue data refer to the percentage of the brokerage firm's total revenues derived from investment banking and brokerage commissions. The large brokerage house dummy is an indicator variable that equals one if a brokerage house is in the top quartile of all houses, based on the number of analysts issuing stock recommendations on I/B/E/S in a given calendar year. Company size is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the company followed, measured 12 months prior to the end of the current month. The *Institutional Investor* All-America Research Team and *Wall Street Journal* All-Star Analyst dummies are indicator variables that equal one if the recommending analyst was listed as an All-America Research Team member or All-Star Analyst in the most recent analyst ranking. Company-specific research experience is the natural log of one plus the number of days that an analyst has been issuing I/B/E/S research on a company. Number of companies followed equals the natural log of one plus the number of companies followed by an analyst in the current calendar year. All regressions include dummy variables for calendar-year and two-digit I/B/E/S sector industry group industries (not reported). The *t*-statistics are based on a robust variance estimator.

* Statistically significant at the 5% level in two-tailed tests.

** Statistically significant at the 1% level in two-tailed tests.

Table 11
Ordered Probit Regression of Recommendation Levels Net of the Consensus
for Bubble versus Postbubble Periods

| | Bubble | Postbubble | p-Value |
|--------------------------------|---------|------------|---------|
| Investment banking revenue (%) | .5103* | .3089* | <.001 |
| Brokerage revenue (%) | -.1868* | .2286* | <.001 |

Note. The explanatory variables are as in Table 3, except that (a) the investment banking revenue and brokerage commission revenue percentage variables are interacted with dummy variables for the bubble or postbubble period and (b) calendar-quarter dummies are replaced with a postregulation indicator (which is equal to one for quarters after May 2002). Shown are the coefficient estimates of investment banking and brokerage revenue percentage variables for the bubble and postbubble periods and the *p*-value for the difference in the coefficient estimate between the two periods. All test statistics use robust variance estimators.

* Statistically significant at the 1% level in two-tailed tests.

Street and among investors during the bubble, analysts appear to have been under acute pressure to generate IB fees and brokerage commissions. As for the response of investors, the rational discounting hypothesis predicts greater discounting of analysts' opinions during this period in response to heightened conflicts, while the naive investor hypothesis predicts less discounting.

We estimate regressions similar to those for relative recommendation levels (Table 3), those for announcement abnormal returns (Table 6), those for announcement abnormal volumes (Table 8), and those for 12-month investment performance of recommendation revisions (Table 10), except that we now interact IB revenue percentage and commission revenue percentage with dummy variables for the bubble (January 1996–March 2000) and postbubble (April 2000–December 2003) periods. Accordingly, we restrict the sample period for these regressions to January 1996–December 2003. For regressions corresponding to those with results shown in Table 3, we also replace the calendar-quarter dummies with a postregulation indicator (equal to one for quarters ending after May 2002). In May 2002, both the NYSE and the National Association of Securities Dealers considerably tightened the regulations on the production and dissemination of sell-side analyst research.³¹ The findings of Barber et al. (2006) and Kadan et al. (forthcoming) suggest that these regulations exerted a downward pressure on recommendation levels. The regression results are presented in Tables 11 and 12. To save space, we report only the coefficient estimates for IB revenue percentage and commission revenue percentage.

The results in Table 11 show that analysts appear to have inflated their recommendations in response to IB conflicts during both the bubble and postbubble periods. But the magnitude of this effect is substantially greater during the bubble period than during the postbubble period. This difference is statistically significant. The magnitude of the effect is smaller for brokerage conflicts than for IB conflicts during both periods. In fact, the effect for brokerage conflicts is negative

³¹ See NYSE Amended Rule 472, "Communications with the Public," and National Association of Securities Dealers Rule 2711, "Research Analysts and Research Reports."

Table 12
Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of Abnormal Returns, Abnormal Volumes, and
Abnormal Stock Performance for Bubble and Postbubble Periods

| | Added to Strong Buy | | | Added to Buy or Strong Buy | | | Dropped from Buy or Strong Buy | | | Dropped from Strong Buy | | |
|------------------------------------|---------------------|------------|---------|----------------------------|------------|---------|--------------------------------|------------|---------|-------------------------|------------|---------|
| | Bubble | Postbubble | p-Value | Bubble | Postbubble | p-Value | Bubble | Postbubble | p-Value | Bubble | Postbubble | p-Value |
| CARs, days -1 to 1: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Investment banking revenue (%) | -.0248** | -.0120 | .083 | -.0121** | -.0080 | .517 | -.0125 | -.0379** | .027 | -.0361** | -.0345** | .908 |
| Brokerage revenue (%) | -.0114** | -.0105** | .827 | -.0099** | -.0110** | .720 | -.0063 | -.0208** | .003 | .0017 | -.0114* | .024 |
| CAVs, days -1 to 1: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Investment banking revenue (%) | -.0076 | -.0052 | .655 | -.0065 | -.0082* | .699 | .0257** | .0130 | .214 | .0555** | .0153 | .002 |
| Brokerage revenue (%) | -.0042 | -.0008 | .376 | -.0054** | -.0031 | .179 | .0106* | .0139** | .521 | .0046 | .0141** | .056 |
| Average monthly CARs, months 1-12: | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Investment banking revenue (%) | -.0016 | -.0151 | .273 | .00001 | .0083 | .420 | -.0085 | .0223** | .003 | -.0123 | -.0051 | .564 |
| Brokerage revenue (%) | .0069 | .0108 | .511 | .0086 | .0096 | .842 | .0035 | .0136 | .101 | -.0036 | .0091 | .019 |

Note. The explanatory variables are as in Tables 6, 8, and 10, except that the investment banking revenue and brokerage commission revenue percentage variables are interacted with dummy variables for the bubble or postbubble period. Shown are the coefficient estimates of the investment banking and brokerage revenue percentage variables for the bubble and postbubble periods and the p-value for the difference in the coefficient estimate between the two periods. Day (month) 0 is the recommendation revision date. All test statistics use robust variance estimators. CAR = cumulative abnormal return; CAV = cumulative abnormal volume.

* Statistically significant at the 5% level in two-tailed tests.

** Statistically significant at the 1% level in two-tailed tests.

during the bubble; it is positive and statistically significantly higher during the postbubble period.

Table 12 shows that, in regressions of 3-day abnormal returns, the coefficients of both IB revenue percentage and commission revenue percentage are negative and statistically significant during the bubble period for both groups of upgrades. For the added-to-strong-buy group, the coefficient of IB revenue percentage is significantly lower during the bubble period than during the postbubble period. For downgrades, the coefficients of both variables are generally negative in both periods, and they are statistically significantly lower during the postbubble period.

In regressions of 3-day abnormal volumes, the coefficients of IB revenue percentage and commission revenue percentage are negative for upgrades and positive for downgrades in all cases, both during and after the bubble. These coefficients are not statistically significantly different between the bubble and postbubble periods for both groups of upgrades and one group of downgrades. For the dropped-from-strong-buy group, the coefficient of IB revenue percentage is statistically significantly larger during the bubble period than during the postbubble period, but the coefficient of the commission revenue percentage is statistically significantly smaller. In regressions of 12-month postrecommendation stock performance, the coefficients of both variables are statistically insignificant both during and after the bubble period in nearly all cases, and this finding is consistent with the results shown in Table 10 for the full sample period.

Overall, analysts appear to respond to IB conflicts both during and after the bubble, but the magnitude of their response declines during the postbubble period. Perversely, while analysts do not seem to respond to brokerage conflicts during the bubble, they appear to do so after the bubble. Perhaps the intense regulatory and media focus on IB conflicts has led analysts to look for alternative avenues. Did investors discount conflicted analysts' opinions more during the bubble than in the postbubble period? The answer to this question is unclear. However, our evidence does not support the notion that investors threw caution to the wind during the bubble.

8. Summary and Conclusions

Following the collapse of the late-1990s U.S. stock market bubble, there has been a widespread hue and cry from investors and regulators over the conflicts of interest faced by Wall Street stock analysts. The discovery of e-mail messages, in which analysts were privately disparaging stocks that they were touting publicly, led to the landmark \$1.4 billion settlement between a number of leading Wall Street firms and securities regulators in April 2003. The settlement requires the firms to disclose IB conflicts in analyst reports and imposes a variety of restrictions designed to strengthen the firewalls that separate research from IB. Part of the settlement funds are set aside for investor education and for research produced by independent firms. The settlement basically presumes that analysts

respond to the conflicts by inflating their stock recommendations and that investors take analysts' recommendations at face value.

Consistent with the view of the media and regulators, we find that optimism in stock recommendations is positively related to the importance of both IB and brokerage businesses to an analyst's employer. This pattern is more pronounced during the late-1990s stock market bubble with respect to IB conflicts. However, we provide several pieces of empirical evidence that suggest that investors are sophisticated enough to adjust for this bias. First, the short-term reactions of both stock prices and trading volumes to recommendation upgrades vary negatively with the magnitude of potential IB or brokerage conflicts faced by analysts. For instance, over the 3 days surrounding an upgrade to strong buy, a 1-standard-deviation increase in the proportion of revenue from IB is associated with a .31 percentage point decrease in abnormal returns and a .12 percentage point decrease in abnormal volume. These results suggest that investors ascribe lower credibility to an analyst's upgrade when the analyst is subject to greater pressures to issue an optimistic view. For downgrades, conflict severity varies negatively with the short-term stock price reaction and positively with the short-term trading volume impact. This pattern is consistent with the idea that investors perceive an analyst to be more credible if he or she is willing to voice an unfavorable opinion on a stock despite greater pressures to be optimistic.

Second, we find no evidence that the 1-year investment performance of recommendation revisions is related to the magnitude of analysts' conflicts, either for upgrades or for downgrades. This finding suggests that, on average, investors properly discount an analyst's opinions for potential conflicts at the time the opinion is issued. Finally, investors discounted conflicted analysts' opinions during the late-1990s stock bubble, even in the face of the prevailing market euphoria. This evidence does not support the popular view that recommendations of sell-side analysts led investors to throw caution to the wind during the bubble period.

Overall, our empirical findings suggest that while analysts do respond to IB and brokerage conflicts by inflating their stock recommendations, the market discounts these recommendations after taking analysts' conflicts into account. These findings are reminiscent of the story of the nail soup told by Brealey and Myers (1991), except that here analysts (rather than accountants) are the ones who put the nail in the soup and investors (rather than analysts) are the ones to take it out. Our finding that the market is not fooled by biases stemming from conflicts of interest echoes similar findings in the literature on conflicts of interest in universal banking (for example, Kroszner and Rajan 1994, 1997; Gompers and Lerner 1999) and on bias in the financial media (for example, Bhattacharya et al., forthcoming; Reuter and Zitzewitz 2006). Finally, while we cannot rule out the possibility that some investors may have been naive, our findings do not support the notion that the marginal investor was systematically misled over the last decade by analysts' recommendations.

Appendix

This Appendix describes the characteristics of disclosing and nondisclosing private securities firms, sheds some light on their decisions to publicly disclose their income statements, and examines whether the resulting selection bias affects our main results in Table 3. Table A1 provides summary statistics of recommendation levels and characteristics of disclosing and nondisclosing private securities firms. Compared with nondisclosing firms, disclosing firms tend to be smaller and more liquid and issue somewhat more optimistic stock recommendations. The mean recommendation level is slightly higher for disclosing firms than for nondisclosing firms. The median disclosing firm is smaller and holds more liquid assets than the median nondisclosing firm. All these differences are statistically significant. The two groups of firms have similar financial leverage ratios and 2-year growth rates in total assets.

We next examine cross-sectional determinants of a private securities firm's decision to disclose its income statement. In an excellent review of the corporate disclosure literature, Healy and Palepu (2001) point out that a firm is more willing to voluntarily disclose financial information when it needs to raise external financing and when it is less concerned that the disclosure would damage its competitive position in product markets. *Ceteris paribus*, firms with greater growth opportunities, higher financial leverage, and less liquid resources are more likely to need external financing. They are more likely to be open with potential investors by disclosing financial information, including their income statements. Similarly, smaller firms are likely to have greater need for external financing as they try to grow. In addition, given the intense competition in the securities business, smaller private firms are also likely to be more willing to disclose their profits and profitability because they have less business at stake. For both reasons, smaller firms are likely to be more willing to disclose financial information. We control for firm size by the natural logarithm of one plus total assets in millions of dollars, for growth opportunities by the 2-year growth rate of total assets, for financial leverage by the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, and for liquidity by the ratio of cash and equivalents to total assets. We estimate a probit regression of DISCLOSER, which equals one for a disclosing firm and is zero otherwise.

In accordance with the predictions of corporate disclosure theory, the coefficients on firm size and liquidity are negative, and the coefficient on growth is positive. Contrary to the prediction, however, the coefficient on leverage is negative. All of these coefficients are highly statistically significant. The pseudo- R^2 -value of this model is .08. To save space, these results are not shown in a table.

Finally, we examine whether the selection bias caused by a private securities firm's disclosure choice (and, consequently, the availability of data on IB revenue percentage and commission revenue percentage) affects our main results in Table 3. While there is no Heckman selectivity correction for the ordered probit model, there is one for the regular probit model. So we define a binary variable to

Table A1
Summary Statistics for Disclosing and Nondisclosing Private Securities Firms

| Variable | Mean | | P-Value of t-Test | Median | | p-Value of Rank Sum Test | Sample Size | |
|---|------------|---------------|----------------------|------------|---------------|-----------------------------|-------------|---------------|
| | Disclosers | Nondisclosers | | Disclosers | Nondisclosers | | Disclosers | Nondisclosers |
| Recommendation level: | | | | | | | | |
| Level | 3.902 | 3.810 | <.001 | 4 | 4 | <.001 | 62,417 | 181,068 |
| Level minus median level | .036 | .010 | <.001 | 0 | 0 | <.001 | 62,417 | 181,068 |
| Firm size: | | | | | | | | |
| Total assets (\$ millions) | 383.37 | 1,863.52 | <.001 | 4.05 | 28.43 | <.001 | 365 | 615 |
| Book equity (\$ millions) | 26.40 | 68.98 | <.001 | 1.97 | 10.56 | <.001 | 365 | 615 |
| Financial leverage: | | | | | | | | |
| Long-term debt to total assets | .0539 | .0653 | .253 | 0 | .002 | .004 | 365 | 615 |
| Total debt to total assets | .0685 | .1823 | .295 | 0 | .018 | <.001 | 365 | 615 |
| Liquidity: cash and equivalents to total assets | .2392 | .1816 | .001 | .101 | .052 | .0001 | 365 | 615 |
| 2-Year growth rate | .0849 | .0697 | .440 | .052 | .020 | .099 | 246 | 541 |

Note. Disclosers are brokers that publicly disclose their income statements, while nondisclosers are brokers that do not disclose them. The statistics for recommendation level are computed from individual analysts' recommendation levels at the end of each quarter in the sample. The median recommendation level is computed at the end of each quarter and is based on all analysts recommending a stock. The statistics for broker characteristics are computed across broker years. The firm size statistics are inflation adjusted (with Consumer Price Index numbers and with 2003 as the base year). The 2-year growth rate is $(\text{Total assets}_t / \text{Total assets}_{t-2})^{1/2} - 1$.

measure an optimistic recommendation that equals one if an analyst's recommendation level on a stock exceeds the consensus level and equals zero otherwise. We then replace the dependent variable in the regression in Section 4 with this optimistic recommendation dummy. Using the subsample of private securities firms, we estimate the resulting equation in two ways: (a) with a regular probit model and (b) with a Heckman selectivity-corrected probit model, where we use the equation described in the second paragraph of this Appendix as the selection equation. When we use approach b, the coefficient of the selection term (that is, the inverse Mills ratio) is statistically significant in the second-stage probit regression. What is more important for our purposes is that the sign, magnitude, and statistical significance of our main explanatory variables, the IB revenue percentage and the commission revenue percentage, are similar in the regular probit and the Heckman-corrected probit regressions. These results do not support the idea that our main findings are driven by the selection bias caused by a private securities firm's decision to disclose its revenue breakdown. To save space, these results are not shown in a table.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned employee of Elliott & Elliott, P.A. does hereby certify that she has served below listed parties with a copy of the pleading(s) indicated below by mailing a copy of same to them in the United States mail, by regular mail, with sufficient postage affixed thereto and return address clearly marked on the date indicated below:

RE: Application of Carolina Water Service, Inc. for adjustment of rates and charges and modification of certain terms and conditions for the provision of water and sewer service

DOCKET NO.: 2011-47-WS


PARTIES SERVED: Nanette S. Edwards, Esquire
Jeffrey M. Nelson, Esquire
Office of Regulatory Staff
1401 Main Street, Suite 900
Columbia, SC 29211

Laura P. Valtorta, Esquire
Forty Love Point Homeowners' Association
903 Calhoun Street
Columbia, SC 29201

Charles Cook, Esquire
Cook Law Firm
6806 Pine Tree Circle
Columbia, SC 29206

PLEADING: Rebuttal Testimony of Pauline M. Ahern

August 24, 2011


Jackie C. Livingston, Paralegal